Introduction
Large software systems used in practice typically exhibit more complex behavior than small well-understood programs.
Often, such systems display degraded behavior as they react to changes in the environment.
Under ideal circumstances, the system's behavior satisfies a set of application-dependent preferred constraints. Each constraint typically preserves a certain level of "correctness," and each has an associated cost. In the presence of events not under the system's control, e.g., faults due to its environment, certain constraints may become difficult or impossible to satisfy, and the application designer may choose to relax them as long as the resulting behavior is sufficiently "close" to the preferred behavior. Other external events, e.g., bug fixes or compensating actions, can later cause a system to return to a more preferred behavior. In the security application, faults correspond to breaches in security and integrity, e.g., students modifying a grades file; fixes correspond to repairing security holes, e.g., changing the passwords of accounts that have been illegally accessed.
Numerous specification techniques have been successfully used to characterize the functional properties,
i.e., input-output behavior, of systems but only a few have been applied, with limited success, to specify security properties as well (e.g., [2, 6, 12, 71) . These attempts typically treat security constraints as additional functional constraints of a system, resulting in a monolithic specification that fails to distinguish between correctness properties independent of security concerns and those specific to privacy and protection.
In this paper, we describe the relaxation lattice method, a new approach to specifying graceful degradation for a large class of systems. We apply this method to the security domain by identifying degraded system behaviors with those that may result from security violations such as a user of one security class obtaining access rights associated with those of a higher class. Our method can be used in two ways: (1) as a descriptive technique for specifying the behavior of existing systems in which breaches of security may inadvertently or unavoidably occur and (2) as a formal design technique for specifying a range of behaviors, from ideal to undesired, of systems to be implemented.
The key to our method is the incorporation of sets of constraints into standard (functional) specifications. As with the usual correspondence between specifications and implementations, the less constraining the specification, the greater the number of possible implementations. The significant advantage our method enjoys over others is the clean separation between the specification of a system's functional behavior in the absence of faults and that in the presence of faults due to its environment. By factoring out correctness constraints from security constraints, we can characterize the essential trade-offs between the costs of preserving security constraints and the costs of relaxing them. Thus, the price one must pay for a secure system can be calculated in terms of the level of security desired.
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General Model

Relaxation Lattices
Let A be a set of simple object automata having the same set of states, the same initial state, and the same operations, but (possibly) different transition functions.
We say that A is a lattice of automata if the set {L(A) I A E A} is a lattice under reverse inclusion (i.e., the smallest language is at the top). We call the language of the automaton at the top of the lattice the preferred behavior of the lattice.
A relaxation lattice is given by a set of constraints C, a lattice of automata A, and a lattice homomorphism, $I: 2c + A. For now, we leave a relaxation lattice's set of constraints uninterpreted since the meaning of such constraints is domain-dependent. It suffices to think of each constraint as an assertion to be satisfied. We will see that in the security domain, the set of constraints roughly corresponds to the complement of the set of capabilities that processes have with respect to objects (protected resources) in the system. We orient the lattice 2c so that the largest (intuitively, the strongest) set of constraints lies at the top, and $(C) is the preferred behavior of A. In general, is defined over a sublattice of
2c.
A relaxation lattice is thus a lattice of simple object automata parameterized by a set of constraints, where the stronger the set of constraints, the smaller the language accepted. Informally, a relaxation lattice describes an object's conditional behavior. If the environment is such that the object satisfies constraints C E C, then the object will behave like the simple object g(C), accepting the language L($(C)). While an object is able to satisfy its strongest set of constraints, it will accept only histories from its preferred behavior.
If changes to the environment, e.g., security violations, force the object to satisfy a weaker set, then it will accept additional "weakly correct" histories, which are undesired but perhaps tolerated. Further changes to the environment may later cause the object to satisfy a more desired behavior.
The relaxation method is appropriate for modeling the behavior of objects for which there is a meaningful cost associated with moving up the relaxation lattice. The higher one goes in the lattice, the higher the price paid for the more preferred behavior. In the security domain, we use constraints to model the cost of tolerating violations such as the cost of implementing a secure encryption algorithm or the cost of hiring personnel to guard a locked room.
The Environment
The environment determines which behavior, preferred or otherwise, an object exhibits. del(emp, e) = emp del(ins(q, e), e l ) = if e = e l then q isEmp(emp) =true isEmp(ins(q, e)) = false isln(emp, e) = false isln(ins(q, e), e l ) = (e = e l ) v isln(q, e l ) For each automaton in a lattice A, the sets of states (values) are the same, but their transition functions differ.
Thus, their specifications will all use the same trait, but will have different interfaces.
Application of Model to Security
Relaxation lattices can be used to specify certain kinds of security properties. Informally in this domain, the objects are the resources to be protected, e.g., files, directories, and laserwriters, and the processes are the users, e.g., people and programs, of these resources.
The environment captures the privileges of the users, i.e., the rights of users to execute certain operations on the resources. The environment corresponds to an accessrights matrix [ l l ] , which can change as protection is breached. To preserve secrecy, we must ensure that unauthorized users are prevented from executing operations that return information about the object's state, and to preserve integrity, we must ensure that unauthorized users are prevented from executing operations that modify the object's state.
Secure Object Automata
Let S and 0 be the sets of subjects and objects.
Intuitively, S consists of all system users and programs, i.e., processes in our general model; 0 consists of all the resources to be protected, e.g., files, directories, and laserwriters. Let M be an access-rights matrix (1 11 where the (i, 1)-th entry in M is a set of rights that subject i E S has for object j E 0.
Unlike standard models of security (e.g., Bell and LaPadula's [ l ] or Lampson's (1 11) in our model, a right of a subject i is not just the name of an access mode (e.g., Read, Modify, Execute) or operation (e.g., Enq, Deq), but is a pair of predicates (i.e., pre-and postconditions) on the name of each operation of object j. For example, an entry for a subject P on a file f might contain the following pair of predicates for a Write operation:
f:: Write(v: value) :: P requires id(P) = owner(f) ensures val(f3 = v where "id", "owner," and "val" are defined in the appropriate traits. This element of the (P, f) entry in M restricts the process P invoking the Write operation to be the owner of the file f.
Definition 1:
A history H is secure if for each operation "A:: e ::P" in H there exists some (pre, post) pair of predicates for operation e in the (P, A)-th entry of Msuch that e.pre(s) A e.post(s, s'), where s, s' E STATEA and s is the state of A upon invoking e and s' is the state upon return.
A secure object aufomaton Secure(A) is an object automaton that accepts histories of the simple object automaton A such that each history in L(Secure(A)) is secure.
Since an access-rights matrix M can be viewed as a set of permissions, we identify an environment's set of constraints (its "state") to be the complement of the set of permissions. Intuitively, constraints are prohibitions of the form "User X does not have the capability for operation Y on object Z," that are formally derivable from the sets of pairs of predicates of M.
Secure Mail Queue
Although secrecy and integrity are often treated as monolithic properties, they can be viewed as subject to graceful degradation. For example, consider a mail queue Suppose Alice is a faculty member and Bob a student.
Ideally, the following constraints hold (among many others) :
SI
Alice cannot dequeue messages.
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Bob cannot list Alice's message.
If Alice discovers a way to relax constraint SI, then the specification for Deq would change as shown in Figure   3 In general, our relaxation lattice method suggests the Identify a set of constraints C that characterizes the preferred behavior. This set induces a lattice 2c.
Not all elements in the lattice may correspond to an intuitively meaningful behavior, let alone an acceptable one. The homomorphism 9 determines which elements in the lattice of automata represent acceptable behaviors.
Given the lattices of constraints and adomata, the cost function determines the price one must pay in moving up the lattice of automata toward the preferred behavior.
For the security domain, the objects are the protected resources, the processes that invoke operations on the objects are the people and programs that have access to the resources, and the set of constraints to satisfy is the complement of the set of capabilities of users for accessing the resources.
The relaxation lattice method is a natural way to capture graceful degradation in large, complex, realistic systems. Moreover, the method is quite flexible. Here, we have applied the method to the security domain. We have found it to be an equally appropriate and intuitively appealing method for capturing graceful degradation of replicated objects in fault-tolerant distributed systems, and of highly concurrent objects in transaction-based database systems [lo] .
